



Tanintharyi Coalition Resource Watch

March 2026

# Urgent Action Required to Sever the junta's Financial Lifeline from Offshore Gas Revenues

## Tanintharyi Offshore Gas Sector:

Highlighting Financing Conflict, Undermining Communities in  
Tanintharyi



## Executive Summary

Myanmar's offshore oil and gas sector has functioned for more than three decades as a central pillar of the country's political economy and a major financial foundation of military rule. Since the 1990s, large-scale offshore gas projects in the Andaman Sea, such as Yadana, Yetagun, and Zawtika, have generated substantial foreign currency revenues through exports primarily to Thailand. These projects were developed through production-sharing contracts between multinational oil and gas companies and the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which has historically operated under direct military control.

Offshore gas revenues have provided Myanmar's military authorities with stable and opaque income streams that reduce reliance on taxation and weaken domestic accountability. Following the February 2021 military coup, control over these revenues has further consolidated junta power. The suspension of transparency mechanisms, including the Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI), has significantly increased financial opacity. Despite economic contraction in other sectors, offshore gas exports have continued largely uninterrupted, generating an estimated US\$3–4 billion annually in export value in recent years. Human rights organizations estimate that more than US\$1 billion per year in foreign currency may directly support the military through gas-related revenues.

Historically, offshore gas revenues have also been embedded in broader systems of military-controlled economic extraction. Following the 1988 coup, the military introduced foreign exchange policies that enabled systematic rent extraction through a dual-currency system and state-controlled exchange rates. This structure allowed military elites and connected businesses to capture significant economic value from resource exports while obscuring the true scale of revenue flows in official accounts. Tanintharyi Region remains at the center of Myanmar's offshore gas sector and has experienced long-standing human rights impacts linked to pipeline and infrastructure security. Since the 1990s, communities near gas infrastructure have reported widespread land confiscations, forced labour, and militarization. In one major case, naval forces confiscated over 81,000 acres of community land in Yebyu Township to secure pipeline infrastructure, affecting thousands of households.

Since the 2021 coup, armed conflict has intensified across Tanintharyi, resulting in widespread human rights abuses and civilian harm. Documented violations along the pipeline corridor between 2023 and 2025 include arbitrary arrests and detention of at least 129 civilians, custodial deaths, unlawful killings by multiple armed actors, forced displacement affecting thousands of residents, and systematic restrictions on movement, communication, and access to essential goods. Military operations have included artillery attacks in civilian areas,

airstrikes, destruction of infrastructure, burning of homes, and the placement of landmines in civilian areas. These patterns suggest the use of collective punishment against communities living near strategic energy infrastructure.

At the same time, offshore gas revenues continue to play a critical role in sustaining the military's war economy. Ongoing gas exports have provided stable foreign currency flows that enable continued military spending, including procurement of arms, aviation fuel, and internal security operations, even as public services have declined. Although Western corporate divestment from Myanmar's oil and gas sector since 2022 has reduced some direct foreign corporate involvement, revenue flows have often shifted to regional companies and expanded MOGE control. Thai state-linked and private companies continue to play a major role in Myanmar's offshore gas production and expansion, including new projects such as the Min Ye Thu block. This raises ongoing concerns about continued financial flows sustaining military rule.

In response, Myanmar civil society and international advocacy campaigns have mobilized to pressure governments, corporations, and international institutions to cut financial flows to MOGE. These efforts have contributed to targeted sanctions and corporate withdrawals; however, gas revenue continues to represent one of the military junta's most important remaining sources of foreign currency. Overall, Myanmar's offshore gas sector remains deeply intertwined with militarization, human rights risks, and authoritarian governance. Without effective revenue controls, transparency mechanisms, and corporate accountability measures, offshore gas revenues are likely to continue functioning as a financial backbone sustaining military rule and conflict in Myanmar.



Figure 1: Gas pipelines in the Kan Pauk region, photographed in 2013. Photo: Eleven Media



## Tanintharyi Coalition Resource Watch

The Tanintharyi Coalition Resource Watch (TCRW) was formed in 2021, after the coup, by six civil society organizations in the Tanintharyi region to continue monitoring natural resource extraction. All member organizations had already been actively working on natural resource governance, advocating for policy change, legal reform, and accountability among government, ethnic authorities, businesses, and local communities. The coalition aims to strengthen coordination and information sharing among members, while collectively updating and informing stakeholders and the public on resource governance issues.

### 1) Background:

## Myanmar Offshore Oil and Gas as a Pillar of Authoritarian Rule

Myanmar's offshore oil and gas sector has for three decades now constituted a central pillar of the country's political economy and one of its most significant sources of foreign exchange. Since the mid- 1990s, large-scale offshore gas projects in the Andaman Sea were developed under production-sharing contracts between the multinational oil and gas companies and the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). While officially a commercial entity, MOGE has historically operated under the direct control of successive military regimes, embedding offshore hydrocarbons within structures of authoritarian governance rather than civilian oversight.

Gas exports primarily to Thailand and later to China, have generated a stable and opaque stream of revenue for the state. Scholars have consistently shown that such revenue has insulated Myanmar's military rulers from domestic accountability, reduced dependence on taxation, and weakened incentives for political reform.<sup>1</sup> Unlike onshore extraction sectors, offshore gas development has remained particularly shielded from public scrutiny due to its technical complexity, export orientation, and limited engagement with domestic markets.

Under prolonged military rule, the offshore gas sector has operated with minimal transparency and weak regulatory oversight. Security arrangements surrounding pipelines and offshore

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<sup>1</sup> Kolås, Å., & Vik, H. (2018). Energy, extraction and political power in Myanmar. *Third World Quarterly*.



infrastructure have been closely linked to militarization, with persistent allegations of forced labour, land confiscation, and other human rights violations in affected areas.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, environmental and social governance mechanisms have remained limited or ineffective, with few avenues for affected communities to access remedy or participation.

Following the February 2021 military coup, control over offshore gas revenues through MOGE has further consolidated junta power. With the suspension of the Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI) and the withdrawal of civilian oversight mechanisms, revenue flows have become even more opaque. As a result, Myanmar's offshore hydrocarbons increasingly function not as a development resource, but as a financial backbone sustaining authoritarian rule amid international sanctions and domestic resistance.

## Oil and Gas Development in Tanintharyi: Historical and Political-Economic Context

Large-scale offshore natural gas development in Tanintharyi Region emerged in the aftermath of Myanmar's 1988 military coup, marking a decisive shift in the country's extractive political economy. The Yadana, Yetagun (1990s), and Zawtika (2000s) projects represent Myanmar's first generation of offshore gas projects and have played a central role in restructuring the state and upholding weak military regimes in three key ways; providing international legitimacy and recognition to the military junta, creating opportunities for foreign direct investment, and reorienting the economy towards energy exports. Conceived and implemented under military rule, these projects were explicitly designed to generate foreign currency revenue through long-term gas exports, with Thailand serving as the primary destination market.

### Key Legacy Projects in Tanintharyi:

Project	Blocks	Key Historical Operators	Primary Export Market
Yadana	M-5 & M-6	Total, Chevron, PTTEP, MOGE	Thailand
Yetagun	M-12, M-13, M-14	Petronas, MOGE, Nippon Oil	Thailand
Zawtika	M-9 & M-11	PTTEP, MOGE	Thailand

<sup>2</sup> EarthRights International (2018). Total Impact: The Human Rights, Environmental, and Financial Impacts of Myanmar's Offshore Gas Projects.



Multinational oil and gas majors: most notably Total (France), Unocal (United States, later Chevron), and PTTEP (Thailand) were central commercial actors in these developments, partnering with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to operationalize their projects. Following the divestment of Total Energies and Chevron, MOGE’s equity share in these projects increased compared to the initial stages. While MOGE’s equity stakes varied across projects, its presence institutionalized the direct channeling of revenues to the state, bypassing public financial oversight and reinforcing the military’s control over strategic income sources. This model entrenched offshore gas as one of the most opaques yet lucrative sectors of Myanmar’s economy.

Although production from the Yadana and Yetagun fields has declined as these assets have matured, their political and economic significance has not diminished. On the contrary, following the 2021 military coup, revenues from offshore gas exports particularly those linked to Yadana and Zawtika have become even more critical to the junta’s financial survival. Gas export earnings provide a stable source of foreign currency to the military, insulating it from international sanctions, and enabling to sustain militarized violence, import fuel and arms, and maintain macroeconomic resilience amid broader economic collapse.

### The current shareholder




Figure 2: Overview of the Zawtika Operations Centre. Photo: PTTEP



## Revenue Manipulation and Military Rent Extraction after the 1988 Coup

Revenues generated from offshore gas projects in Tanintharyi were not merely a source of public income, they were deliberately integrated into a broader system of macroeconomic control and elite rent extraction established by the military regime following the 1988 coup. After seizing power, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) restructured Myanmar's foreign exchange regime in ways that enabled the systematic capture of resource rents, with offshore gas revenues becoming a central pillar of this strategy.

A key instrument of this system was the introduction and enforcement of a dual-currency framework centered on Foreign Exchange Certificates (FECs). Under this arrangement, all foreign currency earnings, including U.S. Dollar revenues from gas exports, were legally required to be surrendered to the state and converted into FECs at the official exchange rate set by the central bank, which operated under direct military control. Private possession or circulation of physical foreign currency was prohibited, effectively granting the military monopoly control over all hard currency flows within the economy.

This policy institutionalized a state-enforced arbitrage mechanism that transferred substantial economic value from the public sector to the military elite. Gas revenues from projects such as the Yadana pipeline entered the state through the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which functioned as a commercial arm of the military. These revenues were officially recorded in kyat, using the highly overvalued FEC exchange rate, substantially understating their true market value. The resulting discrepancy between the official and market exchange rates represented a significant transfer of wealth away from the national economy.

Crucially, this "lost" value was not accidental nor economically neutral. Senior military officials and politically connected business networks enjoyed privileged access to foreign currency holdings, import licenses, and FECs at official rates. These could then be monetized through informal and black-market channels at market exchange rates, generating extraordinary rents. The dual-currency system thus operated as a built-in wealth extraction mechanism, allowing the military leadership to appropriate the real value of offshore gas revenues while externalizing the economic costs onto the broader population.



At the same time, the regime's official fiscal accounts reflected only the deflated value of gas income converted at the FEC rate. This deliberate undervaluation obscured the scale of extractive revenues and facilitated the diversion of funds into opaque, off-budget channels beyond civilian oversight. By monopolizing both coercive power and foreign exchange management, the military transformed national resource revenues into a discretionary fund that underpinned regime stability, patronage networks, and personal enrichment.

In effect, the post-1988 foreign exchange regime converted offshore gas revenues into a structural instrument of authoritarian consolidation. Rather than contributing to national development, resource wealth was systematically manipulated to entrench military power, weaken fiscal transparency, and decouple state revenue from public accountability.

## 2) Historical record in Tanintharyi offshore oil and gas until before the coup

Tanintharyi region, the southernmost region of Myanmar is a key center for major offshore oil and gas projects. The region hosts the Yadana, Yetagun and Zawtika gas fields, which for decades have generated substantial revenues for the military regime. Despite declining reserves and international pressure, new offshore gas exploration and production projects under the military administration are currently in development.<sup>3</sup> The Yadana Gas Pipeline was the first transnational energy project of its kind in Myanmar, with a capacity of 1.25 billion cubic feet of gas per day which was to be carried on to Ratchaburi, Thailand (Simpson, 2016<sup>4</sup> ; Rodger, 2013). According to the EarthRights International (ERI, 2009), the controversial Yadana natural gas pipeline under military-ruled resulted in forced labor, killings and corruption. On the other hand, this pipeline has generated more than US\$7 billion dollars for the companies and the ruling military.

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<sup>3</sup> For example the Min Ye Thu Project, which can be seen here:

<https://www.mdn.gov.mm/en/production-sharing-deal-signed-min-ye-thu-project-mottama-block-m-10>

<sup>4</sup> Simpson, A. (2016). *Energy, governance and security in Thailand and Myanmar (Burma): a critical approach to environmental politics in the South*. Routledge.

**a. Human Rights Issue (land grabbing, forced labours, wars, electricity, etc.)**

The communities living in close proximity to the gas pipeline have faced a range of serious human rights abuses. One of these includes the ongoing expansive land confiscation by Myanmar’s naval forces from the late 1990s. The Mawyawaddy Command Centre (navy headquarters) was originally based in Mawlawmying, Mon state, in the early 1990s, however, it moved to Yebyu township to provide security for the Yadana gas pipeline project. In 2001, the navy confiscated 81,196.72 acres of community held lands which consisted of 5 village tract. This area encompassed the lands of 28 villages, home to 3,383 households with the population of 18,280. The land was transferred without the knowledge or consent of local residents. Within the 81,196.72 acres, the navy has only utilised around 3,000 acres for military camps, hospital and infrastructure.<sup>5</sup>




Figure 3: Map showing land confiscation by the Mawyawaddy Navy Headquarters alongside natural gas pipeline routes. Photo: TCRW

<sup>5</sup> TF, DDA, & DPLN (2016). The land confiscation for the Yadana gas pipeline project in Yebyu Township.



### 3) Situation after the coup in Tanintharyi

Following the military coup on 1st February 2021, there has been a dramatic resurgence of violent conflict between the Myanmar military and resistance forces across Tanintharyi Region. This has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands from their homes and lands, and a proliferation of human rights violations against civilians including arbitrary killings, arbitrary detentions, and property destruction. This section charts human rights violations perpetrated against civilians along the pipeline.

#### Human Rights Violations and Abuses:

1. **Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions:** 129 civilians from seven village tracts were arrested and detained between 2023 and June 2025.<sup>6</sup> There were also documented cases in which villagers died after being arrested at the Kaleinaung police station in April 2023 and the Mawyawaddy Navy base on 24 April 2024, raising serious concerns of custodial deaths and torture.
2. **Arbitrary Killings of Civilians:** Ten individuals were reportedly killed by the Myanmar military, while four others were killed by People's Defense Forces (PDFs) on suspicion of sharing information with the military. An additional eight deaths were attributed to unidentified perpetrators.
3. **Collective Punishment:** Practices of collective punishment are regularly perpetrated against civilians living around the pipeline. These include:
  - a. **Artillery Fire into Residential Areas:** Military forces have frequently used heavy artillery in civilian-populated areas during clashes with local People's Defence Forces (PDFs). Civilian areas have also been affected when resistance groups attack military bases, checkpoints, and outposts. The use of artillery in civilian areas may constitute collective punishment and raises serious concerns under international law. Fighting has remained ongoing along the pipeline corridor, largely linked to the continued presence of naval forces providing security for natural gas infrastructure. Reports indicate that the Myanmar military has used airstrikes, heavy artillery, and, in some cases, civilians as human shields, including in situations where there was no active fighting.

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/tanintharyi.report/>

- b. **Destruction of Civilian Infrastructure:** The destruction of roads and bridges is a common military tactic used to disrupt supply routes and restrict the movement of resistance forces. On 29 April 2024, the military destroyed a road connecting the villages of Kan Pauk and Na Bu Lel in Yebyu Township. The road was excavated using a backhoe, creating a canal-like trench, while both sides were blocked with large piles of soil. As a result, villagers are forced to use narrow paths through orchards, primarily accessible only by motorbikes. This disruption has significantly affected local transportation and delayed access to essential services, including timely healthcare.
- c. **Use of Landmines against civilians:** Reports indicate landmines have been placed in civilian areas. A 70-year-old man was injured after stepping on a landmine near a rubber plantation while travelling to his field.



*Figure 4: Road between Kan Pauk and Na Bu Lel destroyed by the Myanmar military, April 2023. Photo: Local*



4. **Forced Displacement:** Due to clashes, residents from villages within the Kan Pauk area such as Zar Di, Taung Yin Inn, Hpar Chaung, Mi Kyaung Hlaung have been displaced multiple times, either fleeing to the forest or to neighbouring communities. It is estimated that approximately 3,000 were displaced from this area in 2024, rising to 4,000 in 2025.<sup>7</sup> Residents that have been forced to flee their homes and are often unable to return due to ongoing military presence or active shelling. In some cases, the military instructs villagers to return, but they do not dare to do so, fearing that clashes will continue. Accessing and transporting food supplies requires using both roads and boats, yet many connecting roads between villages are blocked. Landmines remain a persistent threat, as reported by an internally displaced woman from Zar Di village tract.
  
5. **Restrictions on Freedom of Movement:** In the post-coup period, the military has imposed strict rules, imposing curfews and checkpoints making travel, transport and access to vital commodities very difficult. This has had a range of serious impacts on local livelihoods including the suppression of local incomes and the increase in prices of commodities such as rice, medicine and cooking oil. Violations against freedom of movement include:
  - a. **Motorcycle ban:** A ban on motorcycle use in ten villages around the Kan Pauk area was imposed on January 25, 2023, after three people including the military-appointed administrator of the Kan Pauk village tract were shot by PDF members while riding a motorbike. Locals need to rely on bicycles and three-wheel motorbikes which takes more time and cost. This has had a severe impact on the livelihoods of daily wage laborers, particularly those working as taxi drivers, leaving many of them unemployed.
  
  - b. **Checkpoints:** Checkpoints have significantly increased on rural roads across the township, reportedly for security purposes, but in practice used to control movement and cut off support to resistance groups. Many checkpoints are operated with the support of the Pyu Saw Htee militia, a proxy force trained and armed by the Myanmar military, often working alongside soldiers and police. At these checkpoints, vehicles are required to stop for inspections, including phone checks and bag searches. Surprise checkpoints are also common. There have been reported arrests based on allegedly suspicious photos or messages found

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<sup>7</sup> FE5 Report

on mobile phones. Villagers are required to obtain permission slips to access their orchards, further restricting freedom of movement. Checkpoints have also been used to restrict humanitarian aid delivery, limiting access to essential assistance. A driver from Kan Pauk reported: “There is no coordination or consistency between checkpoints. In some cases, one checkpoint allows the transport of rice, while another checkpoint later prohibits and confiscates it.” Recent reports indicate the presence of two checkpoints along Kaleinaung Road, three Pyu Saw Htee checkpoints in Thea Chaung, Hpaung Taw, and Min Thar village tracts, and one navy checkpoint in Pa Ya village, reportedly aimed at restricting the movement of local PDFs.



*Figure 5: Three-wheeled motorbikes in Kan Pauk village following the motorcycle ban, October 2023. Photo: Local*

## 6. Attacks on and Destruction of Civilian Property:

- a. **Burning houses:** There are frequent reports of the military burning houses upon entering villages. Villages are set ablaze after military troops enter and station in villages. In one incident it was reported that the military burnt down 20 houses between the 24th August and 2nd September, 2025 in Taung Yin Inn Village, Hpar Chaung village tract, Yebyu township while the military was based there. A villager reported that “Motorcycles kept at the monastery were deliberately damaged by draining the engine oil and filling the engines with sand by the troops.”



Figure 6: Houses in Hpar Chaung village burned by the military, September 2025. Photo: Local





## Offshore Natural Gas Revenue and Military Expenditure After the 2021 Coup

Production from four major offshore gas projects—Yadana, Yetagun, Shwe, and Zawtika has generated sustained export earnings, primarily through pipeline sales to Thailand and China. Since the February 2021 military coup, control over these revenues has been consolidated under the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state-owned enterprise that now operates directly under the authority of the military junta.<sup>8</sup>

Revenues accruing to MOGE through royalties, profit-sharing arrangements, taxes, and pipeline transit fees have been widely identified by human rights organizations, sanctions analysts, and UN bodies as the junta's single largest source of foreign currency.<sup>9</sup> Unlike other sectors of the economy, which have contracted sharply since the coup, offshore gas exports have continued largely uninterrupted, providing the regime with stable U.S. dollar inflows. As Turnell (2021; 2022) notes, access to offshore gas revenues has historically insulated Myanmar's military rulers from domestic economic pressures and enabled continued spending on coercive apparatuses even during periods of macroeconomic crisis.<sup>10</sup>

Since the coup, direct and transparent disclosure of oil and gas revenue flows has ceased. Reporting under the Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI) was effectively suspended following the removal of independent board members and the collapse of institutional safeguards.<sup>11</sup> As a result, official data on how much of the total offshore export value accrues to MOGE and how much ultimately enters military-controlled accounts are no longer publicly available. This opacity has reinforced the military's ability to manage extractive revenues off-budget and beyond civilian oversight, a pattern long documented in Myanmar's political economy of natural resources.<sup>12</sup>

In the absence of official disclosure, proxy estimates of offshore gas export values can be derived from UN Comtrade data, China Customs statistics, Thailand Customs data, and independent expert assessments. These sources consistently indicate that Myanmar has earned between approximately US\$3–4 billion annually from natural gas exports in the immediate pre- and post-coup period, with Thailand remaining the dominant buyer and China a stable secondary market.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Justice For Myanmar (2021). Myanmar's Oil and Gas Revenues and the Military Coup.

<sup>9</sup> Human Rights Watch (2022). Myanmar: Gas Revenues Fuel Junta Abuses.

<sup>10</sup> Turnell, S. (2021). Myanmar's Economy in Crisis. Lowy Institute; Turnell, S. (2022). The Political Economy of Military Rule in Myanmar.

<sup>11</sup> Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI) (2021). Suspension of Reporting and Governance Mechanism.

<sup>12</sup> Kolås, Å. & Vik, E. (2018). Natural Resources and Peace in Myanmar.

<sup>13</sup> UN Comtrade Database; China General Administration of Customs; Thailand Customs Department (various years).



Years	China (US\$ bn)	Thailand (US\$ bn)	Total (US\$ bn)	Remarks
2019	-	-	3.9	Myanmar Ministry of Commerce and MEITI data (FY 2018–19; mostly offshore gas)
2020	-	-	3.5	Myanmar Ministry of Commerce data (FY 2019–20)
2021	1.4	1.7	3.1	Estimates based on China and Thailand customs data
2022	1.4	2.4	3.8	Continued pipeline exports post-coup
2023	1.4	2.0	3.4	Strong Thailand deliveries despite sanctions
2024	-	-	2.5	Partial data (April–December only)

*Note: Figures represent gross export values of natural gas, not net revenues transferred to the junta. Actual payments to MOGE after cost recovery by operators and joint venture profit-sharing remain undisclosed and opaque.*

Multiple human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Justice For Myanmar, estimate that offshore gas projects generate over US\$1 billion annually in foreign currency revenue for the junta, making natural gas the regime's most important remaining external income source since 2021.<sup>14</sup> The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has further documented that substantial gas payments have continued despite targeted sanctions, with revenues routed through non-sanctioned financial institutions and regional banking channels, particularly Thai commercial banks.<sup>15</sup>

A UN summary covering the 2022–2023 period estimated that at least US\$660 million in natural gas payments from Thailand alone continued to flow to the military-controlled oil and gas enterprise during that period.<sup>16</sup> These sustained revenue flows have enabled the

<sup>14</sup> Justice For Myanmar (2023). *Dirty Dollars: Gas Revenues and the Myanmar Military*; Human Rights Watch (2023).

<sup>15</sup> UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (2022, 2023). Reports to the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly.

<sup>16</sup> UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2023). Conference Room Paper on Economic Interests of the Myanmar Military.



junta to maintain high levels of military expenditure; including arms procurement, aviation fuel purchases, and internal security operations even as public spending on health, education, and social protection has declined sharply.<sup>17</sup> Offshore gas revenues therefore function as a cornerstone of Myanmar's post-coup war economy, directly underwriting the military's capacity to sustain conflict and authoritarian rule.

## Expansion of Regional Companies in Myanmar's Energy Sector

Despite mounting pressure and policy actions, Thailand's private and state-owned energy firms remain a key partner in Myanmar's offshore gas sector taking part in new blocks such as the new Min Ye Thu<sup>18</sup> project as well as discussions on drilling well expansion in older fields aside from the shares increased in Yadana following TotalEnergies and Chevron' exit. At present, PTTEP's stake in Yadana is 62.96%<sup>19</sup> and 80% in Zawtika<sup>20</sup> while Myanmar junta controlled State-Owned enterprise, MOGE's shares increased to 37.04% from 15%. At the same time, Thailand's PTTEP is also planning further drilling and possible extension at Yadana and Zawtika projects into 2025–26 to sustain production.<sup>21</sup> Thailand owned "Gulf Petroleum Myanmar Ltd" signed a production sharing contract with MOGE in May 2025 for Block M-10, Min Ye Thu covering exploration, drilling and production.<sup>22</sup>

Again, the parent company PTT Public Company Limited is a Thai State Owned Enterprise under the Thai Finance Ministry, and it has facilitated payments and currency conversions from USD to Thai Bhat that sustain gas exports despite sanctions.

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<sup>17</sup> UNDP (2023). Myanmar Human Development Update; UN Special Rapporteur (2023).

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.usasean.org/article/first-offshore-gas-project-awarded-coup>

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/general/2773558/pttep-stake-in-myanmar-gas-field-rises-after-chevron-exit>

<sup>20</sup> <https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2025/11/09/statement-on-thailands-pursuit-of-new-gas-projects-that-channel-blood-money-to-the-myanmar-criminal-junta/>

<sup>21</sup> <https://energy.frontiermyanmar.com/pttep-reports-2024-production-yadana-zawtika>

<sup>22</sup> [https://www.upstreamonline.com/exploration/myanmar-junta-awards-first-offshore-psc-since-2021-coup/2-1-1826930?zephir\\_sso\\_ott=dBKs3A](https://www.upstreamonline.com/exploration/myanmar-junta-awards-first-offshore-psc-since-2021-coup/2-1-1826930?zephir_sso_ott=dBKs3A)



## Advocacy and Campaign to International Communities

Immediately following the military coup on 1 February 2021, Myanmar-based activists working on natural resource governance and resource rights mobilised urgent advocacy efforts targeting the international community. These efforts specifically called on international corporations, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and Western governments to halt all revenue payments to the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which came under the direct control of the military junta from the first day of the coup.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, widespread civil disobedience actions emerged across the country, including organised boycotts of military-linked businesses. Workers within the oil and gas sector also participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), notably in Kan Pauk, where the onshore pipeline for the Yadana gas project originates.<sup>24</sup> These actions highlighted the sector's central role in financing the military regime and drew national attention to the links between extractive revenues and ongoing repression.

Through sustained awareness-raising and public education led by small but committed advocacy groups, broader public understanding, particularly among youth networks, began to grow. This momentum led to the formation of the Blood Money Campaign, a youth-led movement comprising individuals from diverse backgrounds.<sup>25</sup> These groups emerged as key local actors, consistently advocating for accountability and calling on the international community to cut off oil and gas revenues flowing to the military.

The campaign has worked closely with national and international allies, including Justice For Myanmar, EarthRights International, Progressive Voice, Burma Campaign UK, advocacy groups in the United States, and ALTSEAN-Burma, among others. Through coordinated advocacy, research, and public pressure, tangible progress has been made, particularly in targeting the international investors and corporate backers of major oil and gas projects, identified as key revenue sources sustaining the military junta.

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<sup>23</sup> <https://arakanoilwatch.com/eiti-suspends-myanmar-campaigners-call-for-upstream-players-to-stop-paying-revenues-to-the-junta/>

<sup>24</sup> <https://newnaratif.com/in-myanmar-offshore-gas-workers-weigh-strikes-to-cut-junta-funds/>

<sup>25</sup> <https://bmcmyanmar.com/>



The key milestone and achievements made by the campaign groups are as follows;

### Divestment: Corporate Withdrawal from Myanmar's Oil and Gas Investment

Company	Announcement Date	Description	Remarks
TotalEnergies	21 January 2022	Announced withdrawal from Myanmar operations; effective by July 2022.	Exit reduced Western involvement in Yadana.
Chevron	21 January 2022	Announced intent to divest; sale to MTI Energy planned; completion April 2024.	Chevron's stake was 41%
Petronas	29 April 2022	Announced exit from Yetagun gas field; effective June 2022.	Malaysian national oil co. divestment.
Woodside Petroleum	27 January 2022	Exited Myanmar Offshore project.	Australian energy company withdrawal.
Puma Energy	7 October 2022	Announced exist from Myanmar aviation fuel operations (by Trafigura deal).	Pupua-based energy company pull-out.
ENEOS (JX Nippon)	2 May 2022	Announced withdrawal via shareholder meeting decision.	Japan's largest refiner exiting.
Mitsubishi Corporation	2022	Announced exit from Myanmar interests.	Part of broader corporate divestment.

The cumulative impact of these divestments reduced direct Western corporate exposure to the Myanmar market and the junta's revenue streams, however extraction operations and revenue flows were often transferred to remaining partners, including state-linked regional companies or increased MOGE stakes-raising concerns about whether divestment sufficiently reduced revenue to the military.



## Key Sanctions Targeting the Oil and Gas Sector (Post-coup)

The following table summarizes major sanctions actions directed at Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and related leadership:

Country/ Entity	Sanction Target	Description	Date
United States	MOGE (Financial Services Restrictions)	US Treasury issued a directive prohibiting U.S. persons and entities from providing financial services to MOGE to disrupt junta revenue flows.	31st October 2023
European Union (EU)	MOGE	EU adopted sanctions listing MOGE as a designated entity providing substantive resources to the military, restricting EU actors from dealing with it.	21 <sup>st</sup> February 2022
Switzerland	MOGE	Switzerland incorporated sanctions against MOGE into national law as part of implementing EU sanctions via the Embargo Act.	March 2025

### Senior MOGE leadership Sanctioned (U.S.)

In addition to the entity designation, some MOGE executives have been personally sanctioned by the U.S. as part of broader actions against the military government, including Myo Myint Oo, the Union Minister of Energy, Aung Min, and, Than Min, senior managing directors, highlighting targeted pressure against key decision-makers.



## Recommendations:

We call on relevant actors to urgently follow the below actions:

### To PTT and PTTEP:

- Immediately suspend all payments to MOGE and place revenues in an escrow account that is inaccessible to the military junta, ensuring that gas revenues benefit the people of Myanmar.
- Halt all new project agreements with MOGE until a democratically elected, civilian government is restored in Myanmar.

### To the Royal Thai Government:

- Use your authority as PTT's majority shareholder to ensure the company complies with international sanctions and human rights standards.

### To Thai Financial Institutions and the Bank of Thailand:

- Immediately investigate and halt foreign currency conversions, especially USD to Thai Baht, that facilitate contract payments to the Myanmar military, a critical mechanism that turns international revenue into accessible funds, directly enabling the junta to buy weapons and wage war on civilians.





# Tanintharyi Coalition Resource Watch

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