

# **Weaponizing TikTok in Myanmar: How TikTok Fuels Militarized Propaganda and Profits from Harm in Myanmar.**

## **1. Summary**

Since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, TikTok has rapidly grown into one of the country's most influential social media platforms. With [over 19.6 million users in Myanmar](#) making up nearly 59% of the country's internet population. It has now become a primary space for political messaging, especially among youth and users in conflict-affected regions. While the platform has served as a tool for both resistance communication and public awareness, it has also been widely exploited by pro-military, military media and nationalist actors.

These actors have exploited the platform to spread disinformation, promote violence, nationalism, and normalize military rule. They avoid moderation by adapting content formats, using euphemism and spreading materials across multiple accounts. Some content includes calls for violence, gender-based threats, and operational military targeting.

The militarization of TikTok in Myanmar reveals how short-form video platforms, when left under-regulated, can be weaponized to inflame divisions, manipulate public opinion, and facilitate real-world harm. Without urgent intervention, the platform will continue to contribute to organized digital repression.

## **2. Introduction: TikTok's Role in Myanmar's Information Sphere**

As of 2025, TikTok boasts over 1.59 billion monthly active users [worldwide](#), with more than 19.6 million of them located in [Myanmar](#). This means that approximately **58.68% of Myanmar's 33.4 million internet users** are active on the platform. TikTok officially launched [internationally](#), including in Myanmar, in **September 2017**, but its user base saw a significant surge after the **February 2021 military coup**. During this period, the ruling junta imposed internet restrictions and banned Facebook, prompting many users to migrate to TikTok for communication, content sharing, and news dissemination.

In Myanmar, TikTok serves multiple roles, ranging from political engagement to economic activity and social interaction. The platform has been instrumental in raising awareness and sharing information during periods of political upheaval. At the same time, it has been misused by the military to spread disinformation and instill fear. On the economic front, TikTok offers a valuable space for entrepreneurs and businesses to market their products and services. Socially, it enables users to create and share content, express their identities, and build community connections.

TikTok's **ease of use**, minimal setup, and short-form video format make it more approachable than platforms like Facebook (which requires VPNs) or YouTube (which consumes more data and demands longer attention spans). Its **algorithmic amplification** promotes instant visibility, making it ideal for users seeking to share opinions, products, or political content without needing large followings. Following Myanmar's 2021 military coup, Facebook took decisive action by banning the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) and affiliated accounts due to their roles in spreading misinformation, committing human rights abuses, and escalating the risk of violence. This ban also encompassed military-controlled enterprises, state-run media outlets, and advertisements linked to military-affiliated commercial entities. In response to the crisis, Facebook enacted Myanmar-specific policies to prohibit content that praised or justified violence against civilians or supported military-led arrests of civilians. As a result of these restrictions, pro-military propagandists and nationalist groups shifted their activities to other platforms such as TikTok and Telegram, establishing new channels to propagate disinformation.

### 3. Media Networks & Cross-Platform Amplification

Pro-military media in Myanmar operates through two layers: state-owned outlets (MRTV and MWD) and semi-independent digital media brands (e.g., NP News, People Media). While Section 4 examines how the Tatmadaw directly leverages MRTV and MWD for platform campaigns, this section focuses on the second tier of actors, those who brand themselves as citizen journalists but serve as amplifiers of the junta's narratives.

A number of media outlets play a prominent role in disseminating pro-military narratives across digital platforms. Among the most influential are **NP News**, **People Media**, **MHT**, **MNP**, **Primedia**, and **PAN**. These outlets consistently promote military propaganda and nationalist rhetoric. Key figures leading these efforts include **Kyaw Myo Min (NP News)**, **Kyaw Soe Oo (People Media)**, **Aung Min (MHT)**, **Naung Taw Lay (MNP)**, and **Sniper Su (Primedia)**.

Their broadcasts typically feature solo, scripted monologues aired in the evening, avoiding journalistic norms like interviews or field reporting. The content relies heavily on their opinion, emotion, and ideology rather than facts, often using dehumanizing language to attack pro-democracy figures.

#### 3.1 Cross-Platform Media Ecosystem

The Myanmar Internet Project has tracked a core group of **ten individuals** who are actively producing and distributing pro-military and nationalist content on TikTok. Although they refer to themselves as journalists, their content typically promotes military narratives and disinformation. These individuals include **Kyaw Myo Min**, **Kyaw Soe Oo**, **Aung Min**, **Naung Taw Lay**, **Kyaw Swar**, **Sniper Su**, **Win Maw (Shwe Than Sin)**, **Thazin Oo**, **Aung Moe Kyaw**, and **Ma Pu Tu (Mahar Thway)**.

Collectively, they manage approximately **50 TikTok accounts**, combining both personal profiles and pages branded under media outlet names. These accounts are primarily used to upload short-form clips, often repurposed from longer videos originally shared on **Telegram** or **YouTube**. The process typically involves filming lengthy propaganda videos, then editing them into shorter segments optimized for TikTok's format and audience reach.

Below is a table of the ten key individuals, their associated media outlets, and their primary TikTok accounts:

No.	Name	Media Name	TikTok Account
1	Kyaw Myo Min	NP News	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@npnews3">https://www.tiktok.com/@npnews3</a>
2	Kyaw Soe Oo	People Media	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@people.media.myanmar">https://www.tiktok.com/@people.media.myanmar</a>
3	Aung Min	MHT	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@mht.news">https://www.tiktok.com/@mht.news</a>
4	Naung Taw Lay	MNP	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@ko.lay.naung">https://www.tiktok.com/@ko.lay.naung</a>
5	Kyaw Swar	KS News Media	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@kyaw.swar0428">https://www.tiktok.com/@kyaw.swar0428</a>
6	Sniper Su	Primedia	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@prime.media.sniper.su">https://www.tiktok.com/@prime.media.sniper.su</a>
7	Win Maw (Shwe Than Sin)	MNV	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@mnv5555">https://www.tiktok.com/@mnv5555</a>
8	Thazin Oo	TZ News	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@thazin.oo054">https://www.tiktok.com/@thazin.oo054</a>
9	Aung Moe Kyaw	Myanma Gone	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@myanmagonenewsagency">https://www.tiktok.com/@myanmagonenewsagency</a>
10	Ma Pu Tu (Mahar Thway)	MNP	<a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@mahar.thway4">https://www.tiktok.com/@mahar.thway4</a>

This coordinated use of multiple platforms and accounts allows pro-military media actors to amplify their content, evade moderation, and increase their visibility among different audiences, particularly youth users on TikTok.

<p><a href="https://t.me/peoplemedianews/76711">https://t.me/peoplemedianews/76711</a></p>	<p><a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@people.media.myanmar/video/7516889685478706440">https://www.tiktok.com/@people.media.myanmar/video/7516889685478706440</a></p>

### 3.2 Tactics for Bypassing Platform Moderation

One of the more subtle but strategic tactics involves **avoiding keywords** that could trigger takedowns under social media community standards. As noted by Kyaw Soe Oo himself, pro-military influencers **self-censor certain vocabulary** to reduce the risk of content removal, while still promoting violence or hate through euphemism and tone.

Moreover, they **avoid sophisticated editing**, instead holding up printed documents or showing images directly from phones and tablets during their broadcasts. This low-tech approach helps them **evade content detection algorithms**, allowing potentially harmful or violent imagery to appear in plain view without triggering moderation systems.



Overall Pro-military media in Myanmar have built a clear and calculated strategy to support the military's image and weaken support for the resistance. Their content often defends airstrikes,

promotes conscription, and discredits opposition leaders and exile media, all while framing the military as protectors of the country. They also promote the 2025 election as a solution, claiming it has backing from major countries like China, India, Russia, and ASEAN.

At the same time, these actors have learned how to work around social media rules. They avoid using sensitive words, rely on gestures, and keep their videos simple, often just someone talking to the camera or showing images from a phone. Overall, their approach shows a growing understanding of how to spread propaganda effectively while staying visible online. It's a mix of old-school tactics and modern platform awareness, all aimed at shaping public opinion in favor of the military.

#### **4. Military Utilization and Branding Strategy on TikTok**

While earlier sections have explored the migration of pro-military influencers and media outlets to TikTok, this section focuses specifically on how the **Tatmadaw (Myanmar military)** and its affiliates are using the platform directly to shape public opinion, suppress dissent, and legitimize military rule. Unlike the more decentralized and semi-independent actors discussed in Section 3, the military's approach is **highly centralized, coordinated, and strategically aligned with its broader psychological operations.**

Since the 2021 coup and the banning of military-linked accounts on platforms like Facebook TikTok has become one of the junta's **primary digital battlegrounds.** Its rapid reach, youth-oriented user base, and limited Burmese-language moderation have made it an ideal space for institutional propaganda. Through a mix of **official accounts, proxy pages, and repurposed state media,** the military circulates curated content designed to glorify the Tatmadaw, discredit the opposition, and normalize authoritarian control.

##### **4.1 Promoting the Tatmadaw Brand and the “Patriotism Campaign”**

One of the most prominent features of the military's digital campaign is the deliberate crafting of a positive brand identity for the junta. This involves showcasing scenes of local support for soldiers such as civilians greeting them with flowers and garlands to suggest that only the Tatmadaw is capable of protecting and preserving the nation. These curated moments portray the military as a stabilizing force and a provider of security amid national turmoil.

To reinforce this narrative, the military frequently shares images and videos of everyday civilian life under its rule. These include large public events such as cultural festivals, [beauty pageants](#), [religious ceremonies](#), and national holidays like [Thingyan](#) (the Burmese New Year). The goal is to create the impression that life remains stable, peaceful, and unaffected by the ongoing political crisis thereby suggesting that the military ensures continuity and social order.

At the heart of this branding strategy is what many observers refer to as the “**Patriotism Campaign**” , a continuous stream of content featuring [military parades](#), [weapons demonstrations](#), [training drills](#), and staged acts of “[humanitarian](#)” aid. These visuals are designed to portray the Tatmadaw not only as a powerful and competent force, but also as compassionate and connected to the public. By evoking nationalism and civic pride, the military seeks to legitimize its role as both protector and provider.

These videos are tailored specifically for TikTok and edited using the platform’s native features including background music overlays, Burmese-language captions, and loop-optimized pacing to enhance algorithmic visibility and maximize viewer engagement. By leveraging TikTok’s content logic, the Tatmadaw’s narrative is not just disseminated, but **strategically engineered for virality**, embedding military propaganda within the everyday visual culture of the platform.

## **4.2 Traditional Propaganda and Controlled Messaging**

Much of the content circulated by military-linked TikTok accounts originates from MRTV and MWD, the junta's official media arms. These clips are often repackaged and stripped of state branding to bypass platform scrutiny, allowing the Tatmadaw’s messaging to circulate in more subtle, native formats.

Many of these TikTok accounts do not clearly identify as military-affiliated. Instead, they operate under **civil-sounding usernames**, patriotic slogans, or neutral media banners obscuring their origin while maintaining the credibility needed to reach broader audiences without immediate suspicion. In the wake of the junta’s controversial conscription law, military-aligned content also began to counter claims of forced recruitment. Videos featuring smiling, dancing conscripts and testimonials of “voluntary service” were widely shared to downplay dissent and paint conscription as a source of pride and joy.

### 4.3 Hashtag Hijacking and Influencer Amplification

To increase visibility, military actors co-opt national and global trending hashtags such as #fyp, #myanmartiktok, #Tatmadaw, and other localized slogans in both English and Burmese. By embedding their content within broader trends, they aim to reach unsuspecting viewers, both locally and internationally, thus shaping perceptions beyond pro-military circles.

### 4.4 Undermining the Resistance: Narrative Attacks and Disinformation

Alongside efforts to boost its own image, the military has ramped up a targeted campaign to discredit the resistance. Social media posts frequently mock and attack opposition leaders and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), painting them as violent “[terrorists](#)” who threaten public safety and national stability. Satirical content, manipulated videos, and false claims are used to cast doubt on their motives and actions.

A common tactic involves spreading edited or misleading clips that suggest [infighting among resistance groups](#). These are designed to fracture alliances, stir suspicion, and weaken the sense of unity within the opposition.

By pairing this campaign with the polished imagery of the “Patriotism Campaign,” the military is trying to do more than just discredit its enemies; it's working to confuse the public, erode trust in the revolution, and position itself as the only path to peace and stability.

### 4.5 Ethnic and Religious Polarization

A core element of the Tatmadaw's TikTok strategy is the use of **ethno-religious nationalism** to build support and marginalize dissent. Much of the content amplified by military-linked accounts promotes **ultranationalist narratives**, tailored to resonate with the **majority Bamar Buddhist population, the** dominant user base on TikTok in Myanmar.

These posts often depict the military as the **last defender of Buddhism and national unity**, while framing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), pro-democracy movements, and the National Unity Government (NUG) as threats to the country's religious and cultural identity. TikTok videos

accuse these groups of [desecrating pagodas](#), disrespecting monks, or plotting to replace Buddhism with foreign ideologies. Such messages are presented not as political claims, but as **moral imperatives**, reinforcing a binary of loyalty versus betrayal.

Some content pushes conspiracy theories claiming that ethnic armed groups are planning to hand over parts of Myanmar to [foreign countries](#). These posts suggest that the country could be divided up or turned into a foreign religious state. The goal of these inflammatory messages is to stir fear, deepen divisions, and fuel ultra-nationalist sentiment all in an effort to boost support for the military.

TikTok's algorithm is designed to boost emotionally engaging content. Short, dramatic clips with nationalist slogans and music are crafted for virality, creating a climate of **fear, suspicion, and ethnic division**. Even when such content avoids explicit hate speech, it fosters an environment where **violence and discrimination are normalized**.

By embedding these narratives into TikTok's content stream, the military is not only promoting **religious chauvinism and identity-based hate**, but also using it as a tool to **justify authoritarian control**. Weak Burmese-language moderation means this dangerous content often spreads unchecked, despite its clear risks to real-world safety and social cohesion.

## 5. Nationalist Use of TikTok

Over the past few years, TikTok has become more than just a platform for entertainment in Myanmar. It's now a powerful space for spreading nationalist messaging and military propaganda. After Facebook banned military-linked accounts in 2018 and imposed stricter restrictions following the 2021 coup, many pro-military voices shifted to TikTok, where content moderation is looser and enforcement far less consistent especially in the Burmese language.

Nationalist actors have taken full advantage of this, using the platform to glorify the military, incite violence against opposition groups, and push narratives that support authoritarian control. In some cases, the content goes beyond rhetoric helping to coordinate real-world threats and harassment. This section looks at how TikTok has been deliberately and strategically used by

nationalist groups to shape public opinion, normalize violence, and fuel online and offline harm in Myanmar.

## 5.1 Actor Role

Several prominent nationalist figures are actively shaping Myanmar's TikTok landscape through coordinated, pro-military content. **Zaw Bhone Hein** is one of the most aggressive, known for celebrating violence against opposition forces and repeatedly posting threats and military praise across multiple accounts. **Naung Taw Lay** uses religious-nationalist rhetoric, framing the military as defenders of Buddhism and targeting opposition groups as threats to cultural identity. **Zaw Pyan Sayar Taw and Pauk Ko Taw**, monks, blend religious authority with political messaging, reinforcing the idea that supporting the military is a religious duty. **Saw Ba Htoo** uses memes, pop culture, and confrontational language to appeal to younger audiences, often mocking the opposition and calling for harsh crackdowns. Together, these actors play a central role in normalizing violence and amplifying military-aligned propaganda on TikTok.

## 5.2 Narrative: Dangerous and High-Risk Content Patterns

One of the most common nationalist narratives, the same with pro-military on TikTok, mixes anti-revolutionary views with religious sentiment. These posts often use patriotic and emotional language, urging people to “protect” Buddhism and “defend” Myanmar. Hashtags like #SaveBuddhism and #DefendOurReligion is popular and helps create a feeling of shared responsibility. Many videos show monks, temples, and religious symbols, paired with dramatic music or voiceovers warning that Buddhism is under threat. This kind of content stirs urgency and encourages viewers, especially young ones to respond, sometimes subtly, sometimes more directly.

TikTok in Myanmar has become a key platform for spreading high-risk and dangerous content, particularly among nationalist groups. Much of this content goes beyond political opinion and enters the realm of incitement, hate speech, and operational targeting. Our previous research, outlined in the report [All That Needs to Be Left Standing Is the Land](#), highlights the extent to which such harmful videos are being disseminated and the serious impact they have on both online discourse and real-world harm.

Contents and posts are often stylized with dramatic music, nationalistic imagery, and viral formats designed to inflame emotion and encourage real-world harm.

### **Incitement to Violence**

In several posts, users make open calls for violence. One video shows a nationalist speaker asking a crowd, "[Can you kill PDF?](#)" to which the group responds, "Yes, we can." This is not a metaphor or exaggeration. It is a public affirmation of killing.

### **Threats and Intimidation**

Death threats are a recurring theme. In one example, a creator warns, "[You guys will die. Just wait and see after Thingyan... be ready to die.](#)" This type of language is clearly intended to threaten and intimidate pro-democracy supporters.

### **Gender-Based Violence**

TikTok has also been used to promote misogynistic threats, particularly toward women involved in the revolution. One disturbing video includes a statement threatening women with [continuous sexual violence](#).

### **Calls for Mass Violence**

Some videos go even further, calling for the complete elimination of all opposition forces. One user states: "[Eliminate all enemies. Use any weapons. Clear them out completely.](#)"

## **5.3 Operational and Tactical Content**

Beyond violent rhetoric, some TikTok content includes tactical suggestions related to military operations. One user openly names specific villages as [bombing targets](#). Other content serves as informal surveillance updates, identifying locations of perceived enemies or opposition activity. These posts indicate that TikTok is being used not just for propaganda, but as part of a broader information warfare strategy.

Finally, Nationalist content on TikTok in Myanmar often follows clear, repeated themes. These include glorifying the military, portraying opposition groups like the NUG, PDFs, and EAOs as enemies or terrorists. Posts frequently use military symbols, national flags, and slogans like “Protect the Nation” to reinforce these messages. Many videos are designed to go viral using memes, dramatic music, and emotional language to appeal. This content isn’t just ideological, it’s part of a coordinated effort to intimidate, incite violence, and mobilize support. The scale and tone of this activity highlight the urgent need for better content moderation in Burmese and stronger platform policies to address organized harm.

## 6. Monetization and Funding Models

### 6.1 TikTok Monetization Restrictions in Myanmar

Although TikTok officially does not support monetization in Myanmar, the platform has nevertheless become a source of income for several pro-military and nationalist media figures. According to the [Media Development Investment Fund \(MDIF\)](#), independent media in the country typically rely on a mix of **donor funding, public service announcements (PSAs), digital monetization, advertising, memberships, and content sales**. In contrast, **pro-military outlets have historically depended on donations from their audiences**, often making direct appeals for financial support through their videos and announcements.

### 6.2 Emerging Monetization Despite Restrictions

Recently, however, pro-military content creators have begun claiming they are **generating revenue through TikTok**. While the platform is not monetizable within Myanmar under its standard policies, creators may be circumventing these restrictions by **registering accounts through individuals based in eligible countries**, allowing them access to features such as **TikTok LIVE gifts or Creator Rewards**.

### 6.3 Revenue Estimates from Mavekite

According to research conducted by **MIP** using the social media monitoring tool **Mavekite**, several pro-military media channels appear to be **earning money through their TikTok content**, despite the country's ineligibility. Mavekite calculates average earnings based on recent activity, particularly the performance of the latest 20 video posts. Though exact methods and verification are limited, this data suggests the following estimated revenues:

ENTITY	MEDIA	LIKES	FOLLOWERS	RECENT AVG ENG. RATE	RECENT AVG ENG. W/R FANS	EST. COST	ACTION
@mht.news 	180	819.6k	125k	4.3 %	5.4 %	\$ 52 - 69	
@prime.media.sniper.su 	918	6.3m	537k	10.6 %	0.7 %	\$ 262 - 271	
@kyaw.soe.oo.peoplemedia 	1.4k	18m	973.2k	7.6 %	1.1 %	\$ 472 - 495	
@people.media.myanmar 	658	1.6m	202.9k	7.5 %	0.6 %	\$ 99 - 102	
@npnews3 	386	7.6m	952.2k	4.7 %	3.3 %	\$ 424 - 502	

- **NP News (Kyaw Myo Min):** Between **\$424–\$502 USD**

NP News is the main platform of Kyaw Myo Min. According to Mavekite, NP News's TikTok channel generates around 500 USD in revenue.

- **People Media (Kyaw Soe Oo):** Approximately **\$450 USD**

People Media is the main platform of Kyaw Soe Oo, and according to Mavekite, People Media's TikTok channel generates around 450 USD in revenue.



- **Primedia (Sniper Su / Khet Hnin Su):** Approximately **\$250 USD**

Primedia is the main platform of Sniper Su, also known as Khet Hnin Su, and according to Mavekite, Primedia’s TikTok channel generates around 250 USD in revenue.

- **MHT (Aung Min):** Approximately **\$40–\$49 USD**

In one case, **Aung Min publicly acknowledged via Telegram** that his TikTok account had begun receiving **financial rewards**, sharing screenshots as evidence.

MHT is the main platform of Aung Min, and according to Mavekite, MHT’s TikTok channel generates around 50 USD in revenue. At one point, Aung Min posted on Telegram that his TikTok account had started receiving rewards.

	
<p><a href="https://t.me/aung09min/1941">https://t.me/aung09min/1941</a></p>	<p><a href="https://t.me/aung09min/1955">https://t.me/aung09min/1955</a></p>

## 6.4 Monetizing Harmful Content

While the revenue figures may appear modest, they are significant in the context of Myanmar’s restricted environment. More importantly, these earnings **stem from content that often includes hate speech, disinformation, and incitement to violence**. This raises serious concerns about TikTok’s enforcement of its content and monetization policies, especially in conflict-affected countries like Myanmar.

In summary, despite official limitations, **pro-military and nationalist media actors are finding ways to monetize their content on TikTok**, blending ideological propaganda with financial

incentive. Their evolving tactics point to a need for greater transparency and enforcement from platforms like TikTok to prevent the exploitation of monetization tools for harmful agendas.

## **7. Platform Moderation & Ethical Risks**

TikTok claims to prioritize user safety through its Community Guidelines, but in practice, these rules have fallen especially when it comes to repeat offenders. Although policies exist to address users who continually break the rules, enforcement is often inconsistent and ineffective. This allows known violators to stay active by simply creating new accounts. One example is military propagandist Ko Thet, who is linked to at least 11 different TikTok accounts. While the platform has banned three, the other eight continue to post pro-junta content without interruption.

Our research shows that pro-military actors are increasingly using TikTok as a backup platform, a place to store and spread content that's already been removed or banned from sites like Facebook and YouTube. They frequently reuse banned material, livestream content, and create duplicate accounts to get around restrictions. These tactics are particularly common on TikTok, which currently lacks the capacity or commitment to stop them.

Well-known figures such as Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, Kyaw Swar, Thazin Oo, Ma Pu Tu, Kyaw Soe Oo, Kyaw Myo Min, Naung Taw Lay, Pauk Ko Taw (a nationalist monk), and Zaw Bhone Hein have used the platform to push extreme messages. Their posts often call for airstrikes, bombings, and arrests of pro-democracy activists. Many of them don't just support military action they also act as digital enforcers, monitoring social media and reporting dissenters to the authorities. In some cases, these online threats have been followed by real-world arrests and attacks.

TikTok is still behind when it comes to identifying and dismantling these coordinated propaganda efforts. Our investigation found a web of military-linked accounts working together to spread pro-junta messages. These actors rely on a strategy of multiplying their presence using numerous accounts to avoid being banned completely. Without stronger enforcement and better understanding of the local context, TikTok risks becoming a key tool for organized digital harm in Myanmar. There is an urgent need for deeper accountability and more effective moderation to prevent the continued abuse of the platform.

## 8. Conclusions & Recommendations

TikTok has become more than just a social media platform in Myanmar; it is a frontline in the country's ongoing information war. While the app has enabled resistance actors and civil society to share critical information, it has also been seized by military and nationalist forces to spread propaganda, justify violence, and incite hatred. Pro-military influencers and media personalities use TikTok to promote targeted attacks, glorify the junta, and discredit the opposition all while avoiding platform moderation through evasive tactics like keyword substitution and account duplication. Content that would typically be flagged on other platforms continues to circulate freely, pointing to serious shortcomings in TikTok's enforcement mechanisms, particularly in Burmese-language content. Moreover, some pro-military and military media actors are now monetizing their content through TikTok, despite the platform's official ineligibility in Myanmar. This raises ethical concerns around profit being made from content that spreads hate, disinformation, and incitement. TikTok's failure to adequately address these issues contributes to a dangerous online environment where harmful content thrives, digital harm translates into real-world consequences, and vulnerable communities are left exposed.

### Recommendations

TikTok must take immediate actions to prevent its platform from being used as a tool of militarized propaganda, incitement, and digital repression in Myanmar. The following steps are urgent and necessary:

- **Scale Up Burmese-Language and Contextual Moderation**

TikTok must urgently improve its content moderation systems in Burmese and related ethnic languages.

- **Dismantle Coordinated Harmful Actor Networks**

- Proactively identify and remove networks of affiliated accounts spreading militarized or nationalist propaganda.
- Go beyond reactive post removal to permanent bans of high-risks actors and their aliases.

- **Investigate Monetization Loopholes**

A deeper audit is needed to examine how pro-military creators are monetizing content despite official restrictions. TikTok must close pathways that allow harmful actors to profit and consider stronger verification for financial features.

- **Engage Local Experts and Communities**

Establish standing partnerships with Myanmar civil society, digital rights experts, and frontline researchers to guide policy enforcement and thread identification.

- **Preserve Evidence and Enable Research**

Allow trusted researchers access to public Tiktok data and archives to document violations, track propaganda trends, and support accountability efforts.

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#### **Myanmar Internet Project**

The Myanmar Internet Project was established in 2022 by a collective of researchers, practitioners and advocates with years of experience tracking developments in the Myanmar digital space.

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- Do you know of any published research which might be missing from our bookshelf?
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- Would you be interested in assisting Myanmar researchers with making their work more accessible to an English-speaking audience?

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