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# Operation 1027: The Ceasefire Paradox

# **Operation 1027: The Ceasefire Paradox**

## **Introduction**

If one asks whether “Operation 1027”, launched on 27 October 2023, has truly ceased with the Haigeng Agreement, the straightforward answer is 'no'. This is because, despite the fact that all the military and political objectives of 'Operation 1027' remain unfulfilled, the ongoing conflict observed after the agreement indicates that the military operation has not come to a halt.

This issue of Burma News International (BNI) - Myanmar Peace Monitor's Bi-weekly News Review examines the paradox of the recent ceasefire based on events and incidents that unfolded following Operation 1027.

## **The Haigeng Agreement**

Facilitated by the Chinese government, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) and the military junta's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) held a third round of talks on 10-11 January 2024. As the talks took place at the Haigeng Hotel in Kunming, China, the outcome is referred to as the “Haigeng Agreement.”



In the statement regarding “follow-up outcomes of the Haigeng Agreement”<sup>1</sup> released at 9:30 pm on 12 January 2024 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, there are seven points – two points for each group to adhere to, three points for both parties to adhere to, and two follow-up agreed points.

The two points that each participating group must adhere to state: “The Three Brotherhood Alliance agreed not to launch attacks on the military council’s camps and strategic hilltop positions in northern Shan State, and the military council also agreed not to launch air and artillery attacks on all occupied areas in northern Shan State.”

The three points both parties must adhere to, however, state: “(1) the immediate bilateral ceasefire to take effect at around 9pm on 11 January 2024, (2) no exchange of fire or confrontations between the two armed parties, and (3) resolution through dialogue in the event of disputes and demands (attacks).”

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1 Follow-up outcomes of Haigeng Agreement <https://t.me/threebrotherhoodalliance/780>

The other two agreed points which state that the Three Brotherhood Alliance – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) – and the military council must avoid harming or Chinese nationals in China-Myanmar border areas or destroying Chinese investments in Myanmar; and that both parties will continue to discuss measures for an immediate ceasefire and other issues” can be seen as follow-up agreements.

In essence, the Haigeng Agreement evidently prioritizes China's concerns over the security and livelihoods of civilians in northern Shan State.

## **The trajectory of Operation 1027**

The objectives of Operation 1027 are: “To protect the lives and property of civilian population, to enable self-defense capabilities, to exercise greater control over their regions, to stop the military junta’s day and night air and artillery attacks on their organizations, to uproot the military dictatorship desired by the entire Myanmar’s population, to eradicate online gambling and scam operations that are widespread in Myanmar including the China-Myanmar border areas, and to suppress the military council and militia groups which are involved in these online gambling (Kyar Phyant) businesses.”

During “Operation 1017”, the revolutionary forces succeeded in capturing 17 towns in northern Shan State and along the China-Myanmar border which are important militarily, politically, and economically.<sup>2</sup> Following the military operation, the Three Brotherhood Alliance forces also captured hundreds of military council’s camps and police stations and seized armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons, and numerous pieces of military equipment from the military council. Hundreds of military junta soldiers surrendered their weapons en masse to the 3BHA. Among these events, the surrender

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2 33 towns seized by revolutionary forces <https://bit.ly/3S36EWj>



of the entire Regional Operations Commands (ROC)-Laukkaing on 4 January 2024 was the biggest loss for the military junta. One that day, the junta soldiers who surrendered to the MNDA included six brigadier generals, 228 officers, and 1,895 soldiers of other ranks.<sup>3</sup>

Although Operation 1017 was largely launched by the 3BHA, other revolutionary outfits emerged in the wake of the Spring Revolution, such as the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA), and Mandalay People's Defence Force (MDY-PDF) under the command of the National Unity Government (NUG), have also fought alongside the 3BHA forces. In addition, the offensives receive ample support from other Spring Revolution forces.

The 3BHA forces themselves stated on the 19th day of the military operation that Operation 1027 will only be deemed successful if it can be expanded into a nationwide operation with the participation of the entire population; and that it should be noted that the people should participate in one way or another thinking that Operation 1027 is important for the nation as a whole.

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<sup>3</sup> MNDA announces seizure of Laukkaing <https://bit.ly/3S758CE>

“Uprooting the military dictatorship desired by the entire Myanmar’s population” – one of the objectives of Operation 1027 – shows the scale of the military campaign, which is not confined only to northern Shan State. Therefore, the Haigeng Agreement, which was achieved through China’s intervention, will not completely halt the momentum of Operation 1027.

## The ceasefire paradox

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) stated that the Myanmar Army shelled Mak Hki Nu, Kon Pawng, and Ei Naing villages in Lashio Township, Par Pote village in Kyaukme Township, Man Hei village in Thibaw Township, and Nyaung Kone (Upper) village in Mogok Township on 12 January – the day after the Haigeng Agreement was signed. <sup>4</sup>

According to the 16 January statement from the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), the military junta launched renewed offensives against the 3BHA forces on 13 January and air and artillery attacks from the junta persisted. At 4 pm on 16 January, junta troops entered within 30 meters from the Kachin Hill in Kokang region and attacked with grenades, leading to clashes between the two sides, according to reports. <sup>5</sup>

Therefore, there are many doubts about whether the temporary ceasefire established through the Haigeng Agreement will be able to halt the momentum of the military campaign in northern Shan State. The answers to two key questions – to what extent the Operation 1027 objectives have been achieved and whether the military council will sincerely concede the areas they have lost control over – can shed light on the ceasefire paradox that has arisen following the Haigeng Agreement. However, the momentum of Operation 1027, which is in full swing with seizures of military camps and towns, could be halted by the Haigeng Agreement.

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<sup>4</sup> TNLA claims junta attacked after ceasefire agreement <https://bit.ly/4b1BGGI>

<sup>5</sup> Fighting resumes in Kokang region after ceasefire agreement <https://bit.ly/48IyTRd>

Moreover, the Haigeng Agreement has also exposed China’s influence over both the military junta and the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) in the northern part of Myanmar. It would be safe to say that one of the agreed points - “To avoid harming Chinese nationals in the China-Myanmar border areas or destroying Chinese investments in Myanmar” – maybe of greater importance to China than an effective temporary ceasefire in northern Shan State.

## Review

In the 77 days from 27 October 2023 – the start of Operation 1027 – to 11 January 2024, the day the Haigeng Agreement was signed – the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) forces gained the upper hand while the military junta suffered significant losses.

The reason for this is that the 3BHA forces have the opportunity to establish proper administrative mechanisms in the territories they have captured during the military campaign. For the military junta, all they have achieved is a temporary halt in the military momentum of the 3BHA forces, which had taken control of 17 towns from the junta. However, the agreement provides no guarantee that other





*The photo shows the complete control of Light Infantry Battalion-289, Tactical Operations Command-19 which is the military council's frontline division based in Paletwa.*



**It remains to be seen whether China will once again act as a mediator for a ceasefire between the military council and the Arakan Army...**



revolutionary forces will not escalate the revolutionary momentum from across the country. In addition, as a consequence of Operation 1027, the regime was forced to hand over the towns of Hopang and Panglong to the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which declared that it would not take sides.

The Chinese government, which declared that the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar was an internal affair but maintained its position defending the military junta on the international stage following the coup, also eventually offered to mediate the Haigeng Agreement. This once again shows the extent of China's influence over the military regime and the revolutionary forces.

However, Operation 1027 has now expanded from northern Shan State to the whole of Myanmar. The Arakan Army (AA) – one of the 3BHA members – is accelerating its offensives to drive military junta troops out of Arakan State. The ethnic army has taken complete control of Paletwa region in Chin State. It remains to be seen whether China will once again act as a mediator for a ceasefire between the military council and the Arakan Army in Arakan State, which hosts major state investment projects such as the Kyaukphyu deep sea port project.

Nonetheless, as the Three Brotherhood Alliance had stated that “Operation 1027” will only be deemed successful if it can be expanded into a nationwide operation with the participation of the entire population”, the temporary ceasefire for northern Shan State which was achieved through the Haigeng Agreement will not last. Similarly, the military junta will persist in its efforts to reclaim lost territories and camps by any means.

While the Haigeng Agreement and the temporary ceasefire in northern Shan State have shown no visible impact on the Spring Revolution, which aims to end military dictatorship and build a federal democratic union, the Chinese government's moves revealing its influence over changes in Myanmar's political, military, and peace-making landscapes must be observed with caution.





What I want to add here is that we believe in the revolution. We hate the dictator. We are determined to root out the dictator. These people's statements about which organization they want to disturb are very wrong comments. All the problems caused during the revolution need solving during this time. Doing these is for our future



**Ma Christine**

Spokesperson of the Revolutionary Youth Conference

*(From BNI-MPM's "An interview with Ma Christine, Spokesperson of the Revolutionary Youth Conference, about the matters related to the conference".)*

# 34 Towns Captured and Controlled By Revolutionary Forces

## Shwepyiyaye

On 21 November, the combined PDFs conducted an offensive in Shwepyiyaye town in Homalin Township. On 22 November, the combined force captured it and arrested eight military council soldiers.

## Khampat

On 4 November, the joint PDFs conducted an offensive against the military outpost and Myoma police station in Khampat town in Tamu Township. On 7 November, the joint force successfully captured the town.

## Maw Luu

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) seized control of Maw Luu in Indaw Township on 13 December.

## Kawlin

On 3 November, the combined force of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the PDF attacked the military council outpost and Myoma police station in Kawlin town of Kawlin Township. On 6 November, the combined force captured the town.

## Reedkhawdar

On 13 November, the joint force of Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), CDF-Zanniatram, PDA-Tedim, CDF-Thantlang and CDF-Hualngoram attacked and captured two military outposts based in Reedkhawdar on No.2 Trade Route on the India-Myanmar border. Then, the joint force took complete control of the town.

## Waibula

On 30 November, Chin defense forces seized control of Waibula in Falam Township.

## Hnaring

On 30 November, Chin defense forces seized control of Hnaring in Thantlang Township.

## Surkhua

On 30 November, local Chin defense forces seized control of Surkhua in Hakha Township.

## M'kuiimnu

On 30 November, Chin defense forces seized control of M'kuiimnu in Mindat Township.

## Lalengpi

On 20 November, the joint Chinland Defense Forces attacked the military bases in Lalengpi town in Matupi Township. On 24 November, the joint force captured the town.

## Rezua

On 26 November, the joint force of CNA and CDFs conducted an offensive against Rezua in Zotung in Chin State under the name of "ZZLMS Operation". On 29 November, the joint force successfully captured the town.

## Paletwa

On 13 November 2023, the Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive in Paletwa town. The AA successfully seized control of the town on 14 January 2024.

## Namtu

On 25 December, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) started attacking Namtu. On 28 December, the TNLA successfully captured the town.

## Monglon

On 5 December, the joint TNLA force successfully captured the town.

## Mongngaw

On 29 December, the joint TNLA force started attacking Mongngaw in Kyaukme Township and successfully captured and controlled the town on 31 December.

## Kunlong

On 1 November, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) launched a military operation to capture Kunlong in northern Shan State, attacking Myanmar Army outposts and administrative offices. The ethnic army succeeded in capturing the town on 12 November.

## Injangyan

On 20 November, junta soldiers and police members from two military outposts and a police station in Injangyan Township withdrew.

## Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni

Since 27 October, Three Brotherhood Alliance—Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA)—jointly has launched "Operation 1027". On 2 November, the Three Brotherhood Alliance took complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni.

## Konegyan

The MNDAA-Kokang successfully captured Konegyan town on 28 November as the soldiers from No.125 infantry battalion based in Konegyan on the China-Myanmar border in northern Shan State surrendered with weapons.

## Namkham

Since 27 October, the joint TNLA force has started attacking Namkham. On 18 December, it successfully captured the town.

## Laukkai

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) successfully captured and controlled Laukkai on 4 January.

## Monekoe

On 5 November, the MNDAA-Kokang and the AA conducted an offensive against Monekoe strategic hill and took control of Monekoe in Muse Township on 7 November.

## Moebye

The Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) started attacking Moebye in Pekon Township on 11 November and seized control of the town on 13 November.

## Nan Mei Khon

The Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) began its offensive on Nan Mei Khon in Demoso Township on 11 November and captured and controlled the town on 13 November.

## Mese

Since 13 June, the joint force of the 4K composed of Karenni Army (KA), Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and PDFs, attacked all military base camps in Mese Township. On 24 June, the joint force captured Mese.

## Mone

From 2 to 4 December, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the joint revolutionary forces attacked the military council's outposts in Mone in Kyaukkyi Township. On 4 December, they captured Mone.

## Namhsan

On 15 December, the joint TNLA force successfully captured and controlled Namhsan.

## Mantong

On 22 December, the joint TNLA force successfully captured and controlled Mantong.

## Kutkai

On 7 January, the Three Brotherhood Alliance - Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) - succeeded in taking control of the town of Kutkai.

## Hopang, Panglong


On 5 January, the Three Brotherhood Alliance - Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) - captured the towns of Hopang and Panglong. On 10 January, the towns were handed over to the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

# Armed clash events in two weeks

(3 - 16 January 2024)

There were **62 events of armed clashes** between the military council, People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/ LDFs) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) from 3 to 16 January 2024, according to the record of Burma News International (BNI) - Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM). Take a look at the regions and states, **Shan State had the highest number of armed clashes, with 21 events.**

According to the record of the BNI - MPM, **3,908 events of armed clashes** were recorded throughout Myanmar since the coup in February 2021 till 16 January 2024.



*(As armed clash events are recorded as one event per day by township, the actual number of clashes may be higher.)*

Armed clash events 0-0 1-3 4-7



Source : BNI - MPM Dataset

# Number of military council soldiers, PDF members and civilians killed in two weeks

(3 - 16 January 2024)



Military Deaths

189




PDF Members Deaths

21



Civilian Deaths

113



According to the record of the BNI – MPM, **189 military council soldiers** and **21 members of PDFs** died from 3 to 16 January 2024. The military council's shootings killed **102 civilians** from Bago Region, Chin State, Kachin State, Karenni State, Mandalay Region, Mon State, Arakan State, Sagaing Region, Shan State and Tanintharyi Region. **Three civilians** were killed in the shootings by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in Arakan State.

In addition, **five civilians** were also killed in the shootings by unidentified armed forces in Sagaing Region, Kachin State and Mon State. **Three township commissioners** from Ayeyawady and Magway Regions were assassinated by PDFs.





Source : BNI - MPM Dataset

# Number of IDPs in two weeks **71082**

(3 - 16 January 2024)



According to the record of the BNI – MPM, from 3 to 16 January 2024 around **71,082 people** from **Sagaing Region, Kachin State, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, Arakan State, Bago Region, Mandalay Region, Mon State and Shan State** fled to safety, following armed clashes, the military council's shelling and the burning of civilian houses.



According to the record of the BNI – MPM, since the coup in February 2021 till 16 January 2024, due to the military council's burning and destruction of villages, arrests, torture and killings and use of civilians as human shields in addition to ground and air offensives across Myanmar, the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) reached **about 2,625,299.**



Source : BNI - MPM Dataset



In a statement released on the Independence Day which falls on 4 January, U.S. Secretary Antony J. Blinken said the US would stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their resolve to bring democracy and self-determination to their country. The military's campaign of violence has not dimmed the strong commitment of the people of Myanmar to regain their prosperity and advance the goals of freedom, peace, and justice. The military regime must end its violence, release all those unjustly and arbitrarily detained and allow unhindered humanitarian access.<sup>1</sup>

Chinese media outlets reported that an artillery shell from Myanmar had fallen across the border in the town of Nansan in China's Yunnan province, where it exploded and caused injuries to multiple people. Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said expresses strong dissatisfaction that the armed conflict in Myanmar has caused Chinese casualties. In addition, China will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens. He also called for a ceasefire between the Myanmar army and ethnic armed groups.<sup>2</sup>

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1 [https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program\\_2/malaysia-myanmar-arrest-01142024111804.html](https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/malaysia-myanmar-arrest-01142024111804.html)

2 <https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2024/01/04/378025.html>

China's state-owned CCTV reported on 5 January that 41,000 people suspected of involvement in online telecommunication scams were transferred to China in 2023 thanks to the cooperation of relevant organizations in Myanmar. Both the military council and the National Unity Government (NUG) have said that they will protect Chinese investments in Myanmar and cooperate in suppressing Chinese online fraud gangs.<sup>3</sup>

The National Unity Government (NUG) issued a statement on 1 January that it supports the one-China policy and will protect Chinese investments in Myanmar. The NUG's Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung said that the announcement was made in order to build closer relations with China to help support the revolution against the dictator.

The announcement is not a change in the NUG's policy, but a confirmation of the existing policy. It was released at a time when China was negotiating a ceasefire between the three northern alliance and the Myanmar military, as well as when China and the military council signed new agreements for the Kyauk Phyu deep sea port project, said Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Regarding that statement, Yun Sun from the Stimson Center reviewed that China will not support the NUG and interfere in Myanmar's political problem, and that statement will not gain a good reputation in the American political community.

David Matheson, an analyst of Myanmar affairs, also said that he does not think that there will be any significant change from China's side due to that statement. The NUG is required to work with the Northern Alliance Group and all ethnic groups, to earn recognition by China and neighboring countries.<sup>4</sup>

Mizoram Chief Minister Pu Laldhuma said at a press conference on 6 January that refugees from Myanmar who have

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<sup>3</sup> <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/online-money-scam-china-01052024044343.html>

<sup>4</sup> [https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program\\_2/nug-china-statement-usip-01052024160801.html](https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/nug-china-statement-usip-01052024160801.html)



**...the quick appointment of the ASEAN special envoy to the chair on Myanmar indicates the seriousness of the incoming Lao chair to implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.**



taken shelter in the state will not be pushed back until the situation becomes normal in Myanmar. The Chief Minister met the central government's Prime Minister, the Internal Affairs Minister, the External Affairs Minister and other officials in New Delhi on 4 January. They discussed the collection of biometric data of refugees and border fencing. He said the collection of biometric data is not for repatriation. So, there is no need to worry. However, the Chief Minister said that he hopes the border fencing will be withdrawn as it could stop the communication between the Mizo and the Chin people.<sup>5</sup>

The Laotian government has appointed Alounkeo Kittikhoun who served as a minister in the Prime Minister's Office and the Lao envoy to the United Nations, as the ASEAN special envoy to the Chair on Myanmar. The first meeting of ASEAN foreign ministerial retreat in 2024 will be held on 28-29 January in Luang Prabang, the former capital of Laos. A Thai politician said that the quick appointment of the ASEAN special envoy to the chair on Myanmar indicates the seriousness of the incoming Lao chair to implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Foreign Minister Saleumxay revealed that under Laos, there would be nine priority areas covering the whole gamut of ongoing efforts to integrate the ASEAN Community. The facts included in the nine areas are: integrating and connecting economies; forging an inclusive and sustainable future; transforming for the digital future; promoting ASEAN culture and arts for inclusivity and sustainability; and developing strategic plans to complement the ASEAN Community Vision 2034.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> <https://bur.mizzima.com/2024/01/08/11559>

<sup>6</sup> <https://burmese.dvb.no/post/633119>

## Remark:

References and news sources for the 'What Happened This Week' section are from local and foreign news agencies as well as 15 media organizations of Burma News International - BNI.



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